Posted 24th July 2008 | 4 Comments

Wanted: a ‘genuine’ 30-year strategy for Britain’s railways

Transport Select Committee Report (front cover). Review (right) by Alan Marshall.

IF anyone thought that criticism of Government policy by the MPs’ Select Committee on Transport would end with the death of Gwyneth Dunwoody—who had chaired the committee for many years—they have been proved wrong by its latest report, which shows the MPs are clearly very unimpressed by much of last year’s White Paper, ‘Delivering a sustainable railway.’
   
According to Ministers, the White Paper was supposed to set out a 30-year strategy for the railways, just like another White Paper in 2003 had set out a 30-year plan for aviation — a plan that many people have become opposed to, as it has paved the way for proposals for extra runways at Heathrow and Stansted.
  
That the Transport Select Committee questions the railway White Paper is evident from the title—‘Delivering a sustainable railway: a 30-year strategy for the railways?’
  
Before reading the whole 58-page document, I turned to the last paragraph (something I was taught to do many years ago when I was an apprenticed journalist; the Fleet Street old hands, under whose tutelage I was fortunate to be placed, reckoned that in most official documents and press releases the real story was usually to be found at the end, not the beginning).
  
Sure enough, the true nature of the MPs’ concerns was set out in their final paragraph — it wasn’t so much a White Paper as a Grey Paper.

If we discount the Department for Transport’s specification for the rail industry from next year through 2014 (the so-called High Level Output Statement, or HLOS) there isn’t much left: “The White Paper has very little to add to the five-year plan set out in the HLOS,” says the committee’s concluding paragraph.

“If the two had been entirely separate documents, there would have been very little to publish as a White Paper, and the Department [for Transport] would have been forced to come up with a much stronger and bolder vision for the long-term future of the railways,” the all-party committee concludes.

“The Government should now seek to develop a genuine 30-year strategy.”

In the view of the Transport Select Committee, the Government should be much more focused on a programme of electrification, developing new high-speed lines, and sorting out Network Rail’s structure.

“After years of sustained growth in rail patronage, we urge the Government to be bolder in its vision and to set out a proper long-term strategy, including the planning and development of infrastructure which will improve the environment and the spatial economic development of the country,” says the committee.


High-speed rail

“It is deeply disappointing that the White Paper dodged the decision on high-speed rail,” the MPs complain. “Although there have been encouraging signs of movement in the Government’s position since the publication of the White Paper, we firmly believe that this is an area where the Government needs to move into a different gear.”

And the MPs warn: “Hesitation now will mean years of avoidable misery and overcrowding on the network.”


Electrification – ‘case is strong’

“The White Paper dismisses electrification too easily,” bemoans the committee. “Even small-scale, infill electrification projects are not given the credit that they deserve.

“The case for electrification is strong, and it is based on both environmental considerations and improvements in capacity.

“Recent indications are that the Government is now changing its mind, and that an electrification programme may be initiated later this year. We are pleased the Government appears finally to have seen sense on electrification, and we recommend that a strategy for the gradual electrification of the rail network be developed as a matter of priority.”


Network Rail

The committee makes several criticisms of Network Rail’s management.  Among these it says communication within Network Rail, as well as between it and the train operators, “is seriously deficient.”

In part, this is a consequence of the separate ownership of trains and track, and the report adds: “The failure of internal communications within Network Rail makes it impossible for senior managers to take appropriate action and resolve problems as quickly as possible.

“The failure to communicate adequately with train operators is likely to be, at least in part, a consequence of poor internal communication. Both failures have serious consequences for passengers.”

But there is a pat on the back for Network Rail’s staff. “Much excellent work is done by a large workforce of good and dedicated staff at Network Rail, but the lack of clear procedures, consistency, communication and management controls combine to undermine all these undoubted achievements.”

In a serious criticism of Network Rail’s structure and governance, the Select Committee says: “It is quite extraordinary for Network Rail to reward its senior managers with huge financial bonuses in a year where passengers have been humiliated and inconvenienced by three separate major engineering fiascos [Rugby, Liverpool Street, and Shields, Glasgow] where an entire catalogue of management failings has been laid bare for all to see, and where a record fine has been imposed for breach of the Network License.

“It is a gesture which adds insult to injury for the long-suffering passengers who have had to struggle with the consequences of the company’s failings. If Network Rail’s members cannot or will not challenge and block such a move, they are not a body worth having.”

The committee disagrees with Transport Minister Tom Harris and the Office of Rail Regulation that the governance structure of Network Rail is adequate: “The range and seriousness of management failings … will only be rectified through very strong leadership from the [Network Rail] Board combined with robust oversight and challenge by members.”

And it adds: “No other organisation is more important than Network Rail to the achievement of the targets and objectives contained in the Rail White Paper and the High Level Output Statement. If Network Rail fails, the industry as a whole will fail.”

“We are concerned that the Government is failing to take the concerns of the industry seriously, and that the Department appears to be working in isolation when it comes to predicting future rail patronage.”


‘Expansion needed sooner, not later’

But the committee welcomes Network Rail’s recent decision to look at the need for new lines. “We are convinced that significant investment in new rail lines will be essential, and the Government must join Network Rail to plan for significant expansion of the network sooner rather than later.”

The committee is critical of the way the DfT is procuring 1,300 additional passenger coaches. Though “much needed and very welcome” the committee believes that “due to the growth in rail patronage, the new stock is unlikely to relieve overcrowding significantly.”

And it adds: “It is entirely appropriate that strategic decisions about rolling stock procurement and specification should be taken centrally. Given the level of fragmentation of the industry, there is no other way to ensure sensible use of taxpayers’ money for long-term investments such as rolling stock.

“However, we are concerned that the Department may not have adequate and appropriate expertise to handle such vital strategic decisions in-house, and to do so efficiently. Matters of such importance should not be left to expensive external consultants.”

The DfT, it says, “must improve its rolling stock procurement strategy so as to create a stable and consistent pattern of procurement. By doing so, it will achieve the best value for money for tax payers, and it will ensure that Britain can continue to have a rolling stock industry.”


Birmingham Gateway project ‘is not adequate’

The Select Committee singles out for criticism the plan, approved by the Government earlier this year, for the £600 million ‘Gateway’ project at Birmingham New Street station, which is at the cross-roads of Britain’s rail network.

“We are not convinced that the current project is adequate. The Government must address the issue of whether Birmingham New Street is ever going to be able to accommodate the throughput of trains required in two or three decades, when the number of services might have doubled.

“If the station cannot be adapted to such throughputs, then the Government must look for alternative solutions now,” says the committee.

‘Weak financial control’

The committee has little financial good news for taxpayers or passengers:  “We have little doubt that cost control has been weak across the industry,” it says, adding that controlling costs needs to be the Government’s top priority in terms of funding for the railways.

“The Government needs to do more to ensure that franchises also control their costs tightly.

“As we have shown on several occasions past, the sheer complexity of the industry has made it prone to unnecessary cost escalation and waste.”

Finally, the committee is also alarmed by the Government’s policy of shifting the share of the industry’s costs away from the taxpayer, which the committee says will be “detrimental” to passengers.

“We therefore recommend that the Government review the planned shift between tax payers’ subsidy and the fare box with a view to pacing this transition over a significantly longer period of time.”

Reader Comments:

Views expressed in submitted comments are that of the author, and not necessarily shared by Railnews.

  • Dorian Angry, lowestoft

    The simplest Network Rail RUS document to read to get a flavour of what is wrong is the Lancashire & Cumbria RUS (draft for consultation). As it covers a relatively small area it is ideal for the "student" to read and the faults (Which I shall not point out here) are clear for all to see. It is available online from the Network Rail site. Apart from an inability to spell the word "separate" correctly and jargon (which is risible at times), it shows the total lack of vision. It is true that cost benefit analysis is dictated by the Department of Transport, BUT if the costs are inflated (as part of that analysis) it is Network Rail's fault. Remember Network Rail is only non-profit making "at the end of the day" - overall "profits" may be ploughed back but they can still cost projects as they like (thus to reward their managers et.al). With this method small projects are never likely to be implemented. I beg you to read one of their documents and see for yourself. As I say freely available online. Finally, I note a clear example: New services have started between Ebbw Vale (PArkway at least) and Cardiff but the service to Newport cannot be, for want of resignalling around Newport. £7 million? Then £10 million? Then.... Who knows? Who is checking Network Rail to see if those figures are correct (or indeed legal)?

  • David Bond, Wellington, New Zealand

    Many years ago I worked as an engineer with the former British Rail, and also the former New Zealand Railways. I have observed both organisatons ripped apart by privatisation, and watched as rafts of taxpayer-funds disappeared into private pockets with little to show for it. I have watched as both countries were finally forced to take their tracks back under state control due to failure of their private sectors to deliver a properly maintained railway. I have also noticed in both countries that the privatised model is utterly incapable of developing a railway to meet the challenging and big-scale needs of the future.

    Finally, in the past few weeks, I have witnessed the New Zealand government finally admit the failure of privatisation and re-nationalise the entire operation. This is now a watershed time, and the success of the new "Kiwi Rail" depends vitally on securing the appropriate competence and commitment at both government and management levels.

    The British government MUST wake up to the same realities if it wants to avoid the country slipping into third-world status.

  • Dorian Angry, lowestoft

    reading Network Rail's glossy RUS documents (Route Utilisation Strategy) one is struck by the lack of vision and unwillingness to do anything at all. A need for a new station is called an "aspiration by stakeholders" and dismissed totally with multi-million pound quotes for the simplest single platform halt. The study and the document must have cost millions, but the end result is that the simplest projects are dismissed with what amounts to disdain. The only projects which seem to be (almost) considered are grandiose mega-million parkway stations - which of course bring in the money. I really do feel reading these RUS documents that if someone suggested building a two-car one platform between (for example) Boston and Skegness, they would be regarded in the same way as a child-sex offender in a rough prison. I do not joke, the language these RUS documents use is so dismissive, please read one and see what I mean. This is not journalistic hyperbole - it really is very depressing... To repeat: it's either grand expensive projects or nothing, the cost of the smallest projects are inflated beyond belief. There has been inflation but there is no reason why a new station cost should increase from say £88,000 in 1988 to £7 million today (even with the disablity legislation) - it's a rip-off. There is a moral issue here - taxpayers without a station still pay. Aaaaaaagh!

  • Paul Davis, Birmingham, england

    The difficulties of planning over a third of a century are noted by MPs but they also note that recent oil price rises represent a secular shift in market conditions - presaging a potential inter-modal shift. This changes the rules of a game that DfT civil servants have wholly misread over decades: hence the Select Committee's concern with poor forecasting models. We are entering a different phase in transport planning. There is simply no capacity - either political or technical - in what has been for a long time a very weak department of state to engage with these issues. In the current jargon, we are dealing with systemic failure. The techniques to deal with this are policy and political, again, not technical or managerial.