A TRAIN operator has been fined £75,000 for a breach of Health and Safety law, after passengers in a stranded rush hour train forced open the doors and some started to walk along a tunnel wall in central London.

Blackfriars Crown Court heard that a First Capital Connect train bound for Bedford became stalled between St Pancras International and Kentish Town. The main cause, according to the Rail Safety and Standards Board, was that foliage had become entangled in one of its pantographs. Power from the overhead line was lost because breakers were tripped by the fault.

The incident, on 26 May 2011, was protracted by a series of misunderstandings between the members of FCC and Network Rail staff who became involved. The situation was worsened by the fact that the pair of stalled 4-car Class 377 units began to switch off various internal systems automatically to preserve battery power, as they were programmed to do, which meant that the public address system in the crowded train ceased to work. In fact, the PA system could have been reactivated for short periods using battery power, but this was not known at the time.

Temperatures in the train rose and so did the temper of the passengers, who became increasingly angry as toilets became choked and communications broke down. Some doors were forced open, partly to provide some ventilation on a warm evening, but then some passengers evacuated themselves from the train. This triggered a further crisis, as signallers then had to block the adjacent line in the interests of safety.

FCC was advised by rolling stock engineers that a second eight car unit could not be used to move the train, because train management systems were not designed to work in a 16-car set, but FCC later said this proved to be wrong. At the time however, the advice meant that a second eight car set had to be divided in the yard at Cricklewood, so that a four car set could be used. More time was lost while this set was then worked 'wrong line' south from Cricklewood at a cautionary speed to reach the stranded train.

Even this process revealed flaws, because one driver was slightly injured when she attempted to couple the sets.

Eventually the passengers were pursuaded to reboard the train and were then taken to Kentish Town, where they were met by emergency services.

Later, the RAIB said: "The driver over-rode a safety system in order to move the train. At the time when the train moved a short distance for the driver to test that it was properly coupled, some passengers were still alighting from the train to the track. When the train subsequently moved into Kentish Town, it did so with at least two doors open. The investigation found that options for evacuating passengers, other than the use of an assisting train, had either been discounted or had not been briefed to those staff responsible for developing the rescue strategy on the day."

The judge said the incident was 'an absolute shambles', featuring a 'litany of mistakes and poor judgements', which meant that the risk was 'substantial'.

FCC pleaded guilty to a charge under section 3(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.

ORR director of safety Ian Prosser said: "The company left hundreds of passengers trapped on a train for three hours with no air conditioning, toilets or communication system. The company's response significantly increased the risk of passengers independently leaving the train on to the tracks, when the safest place for them was to stay on board until told otherwise."

FCC managing director David Statham, who was not md at the time, acknowledged the errors but pointed out that improvements have now been made, including better training and table-top exercises.

He told Railnews: "We were in the first weeks of a new management system when this incident occurred, but its benefits had not been realised at the time. This was not the fault of any one individual. It was the company that was prosecuted and we pleaded guilty because it was the way we managed this incident and the isolated failures in our safety processes that caused what happened.

"There were four investigations in all, including two run by us. These comprehensive internal and external investigations have led to a range of actions to ensure this unusual combination of events is extremely unlikely to happen again."