Posted 29th July 2013 | 9 Comments

Spanish crash driver faces homicide charges

Francisco Jose Garzon Amo

RENFE driver Francisco Jose Garzon Amo arriving at court

THE SPANISH driver whose train crashed on the approach to Santiago last week has been questioned in private by a judge for almost two hours, and is now formally suspected of causing the accident.

A 79th person has died after last Wednesday's crash, in which a train was driven around a curve at more than twice the permitted line speed of 80km/h. The eight coach train left the rails completely and the wrecked coaches came to rest scattered along the line.

It is understood that 70 people injured in the accident are still in hospital, and 22 of them are reported to be in a 'critical' condition.

The driver, who has been named as Francisco Jose Garzon Amo, 52, has reportedly admitted that he was 'careless', and is now facing 79 counts of 'reckless homicide'. He has not yet been charged and is currently on bail, but his passport and train driver's licence have both been withdrawn.

He must appear before the court once a week and will not be allowed to leave the country without permission.

Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy, who comes from Santiago, declared three days of national mourning. He and members of the royal family are due to attend a funeral mass in Santiago de Compostela, which is a Catholic pilgrimage site.

A religious feast honouring Spanish patron saint St James of Compostela was cancelled after the crash, and flowers and candles have been left at the city's cathedral.

Reader Comments:

Views expressed in submitted comments are that of the author, and not necessarily shared by Railnews.

  • Edward , Southampton

    Thanks for the contributions. The top speed of this train is interesting. Although it looks like a Shinkansen style train (I have done safety assurance work on these) with its very pointy nose, it’s line speed is only 200kph and not the 300+ of a Shinkansen. SOo it was only going about as fast as a UK WCML or ECML train. Presumably we in UK drive such trains in an effectively manual mode. The confusion in Spain is that this railway switches gauges and signalling systems along the route so the driver has to be a bit more alert to remember which mode he is in. Also it is well known that when you use an auto mode a lot you get skill fade for manual driving. Plenty of aircraft crashes caused by that.

    So I still think that the system is more to blame that the driver and I hope he has a good union/lawyer to stop RENFE pinning their blame on him too. But we do not have a lot of info to go on.

  • M Jacques, Crewe

    In this day and age there is absolutely NO EXCUSE for any train driver anywhere in Europe to be doing almost 2.5 times the speed limit of any portion of track that they work over. In the UK it is compulsory for all train drivers to sign a route card which is verified by a driver manager when signed that states that the person has been passed as competent to work trains over that specific route. All trains driving cabs in the UK are fitted with black box data recorders that are subject to random downloading to ensure the drivers are working within the perameters of group standards at all times. I accept that we are all only human and are susceptible to make mistakes, but never in my 28 years of working on the footplate have i ever missed any restrictive speed restriction when working in high speed running. In the UK we have visual warning boards and in cab audibkle warnings of any restriction in speed that requires a train to reduce speed by more than 15mph. I wouldnt like to say wether they have a similar system in Spain or not, but if they do, and he acknowledged it but took no action, he gets what he deserves. My driving cab has more communication equipment fitted to it than a desk at the london stock exchange, but under no circumstances would i react to any incoming call wether it be from within the train or elsewhere while braking for any speed reduction, station approach or red signal. Nor would i allow it to distract me. If Spanish train drivers are trained upto the same safety protocols that British drivers are they would only ever respond to any call if in a safe position to do so, (ie on a portion of line where a call can be taken when no use of the brake would be required for at least the duration of the call. Or stationary. Simple answer is, if in doubt, and the call needs to be answered straight away, stop the train if necessary, then take or make the call if you need to call them back. The question that hasnt been answered yet is was the driver using his own personal mobile phone at the time??? If he was, i hope he likes prison food. He will be eating it for a very long time.

  • Chris Neville-Smith, Durham, England

    I've been thinking over the arguments over whether the driver could reasonably have been expected to know when to slow down. At the moment, I don't think it's enough of a defence.

    I generally agree with the argument on momentary lapses of concentration for missed red signals, but I'm not convinced you can apply that argument to a bend. If you pass through a red signal that's green 99% of the time, then yes, you can be caught out - you can go on to automatic and not notice something's different. But you forget a bend this way. A bend never moves and never changes, and it's always in exactly the same point every journey. There are plenty of points on our railways where 100+ mph stretches suddenly fall to 50mph or less, and going too fast is virtually unheard of. Could he have got lost? Not convinced: I go to London only a few times each year, I know the virtually the entire route, and I'm only a passenger. If we was on the phone or tablet to find out where he was, he should have slowed down until he knew.

    The only defence I can see with a chance of success would be if he'd had insufficient training in route knowledge. We know train drivers go get route knowledge training in Spain, but who knows, maybe it wasn't enough. The other factor is that if it can be shown he was careless rather than reckless, that would presumably be a mitigating factor.

    This doesn't excuse RENFE from questions though. You can't always safeguard against the actions of a driver, but I don't think that's the case here. As far as I can tell, the ETRMS could have slowed the train down to a safe speed before switching to other system, and it seems a pretty stupid oversight to leave out such an obvious safeguard.

    Looks like both parties still have a long list of questions to answer.

  • Chris Jones-Bridger, Deeside Flintshire

    Without substantive facts and technical knowledge it has been easy for the general media to directly apportion blame on the driver for this derailment. This is especially so given his reported comments to rescuers and from access to his Facebook page. As with any accident the investigators have to establish the root cause and as more evidence has now come into the public domain it may explain how an experienced driver made such a tragic error.

    The evidence from the data recorder of phone communication between the driver and Renfe control staff appears crucial. If the driver's attention had been distracted it is more than likely he the missed braking point for the curve. Also it appears that the train had run through a transition in signalling systems from modern signalling where overspeed protection was afforded into traditional Spanish signalling where no overspeed protection was available. Travelling at high speed only a momentary distraction and loss of concentration can be the difference that leads to a tragedy. In the UK we only have to look to the 1997 collision at Southall between an HST and a crossing freight train to illustrate this only too well. The driver distracted and without working AWS or ATP missed the caution signals braking too late overrunning the protecting red signal with catastrophic results.

    The introduction of cab radios in the UK has been an important operational and safety aid but it also has to be recognised that their use requires proper disciplined protocol. This similarly applies to the use of mobile phones by drivers, both personal and company issue. I am aware of at least one SPAD where a driver was distracted using his mobile fortunately without tragic consequence.

    What I haven't seen explained has been the role of the second driver. Is this part of the manning arrangements for this type of service in Spain? Was he a trainee? Was he experienced in the route or was he a route learner?

    The use of social media such as Facebook by staff in their private life also raises questions. For staff such as drivers in safety critical positions should they have the misfortune to be involved in a mishap in the media vacuum that follows social media sites will be trawled by journalists in need of a story. If as in this case comments have been posted that may compromise professional competence then an individuals integrity and private life will be subject to intense scrutiny.

  • Edward , Southampton

    90% design and procedures, 10% driver. This railway is like a motorway that suddenly turns into a windy B road, made worse by a short tunnel at end of motorway obscuring the view of the bend. There is nothing to warn of need to slow apart from some notices by the road and previous experience of driving the route.

    The 200kph fully automatic track ends just before the tunnel and changes into simpler signalling with the driver solely responsible for his speed. His barrels along at 200kph under auto signalling (ETRMS) and then switches it over to the other signalling and drives manually, still at 200kph. Just then the control centre rings up and issues instructions which means he has to get out documents to read. He is distracted by this and fails to notice the new speed limit signs until a while into the call. He slams on the bakes but it is too late.

    Whose fault? I say mostly the system design, and procedures that allow a driver to be distracted by calls. What did the co driver not do? Or was there none despite early reports?

    3 solutions 1) Get the auto system to slow the train to around 120kph before that track section finishes 2) Never allow a train in manual control to exceed 120kph. 3) Improve signalling on the slower lines to detect train speed and trip brakes for overspeeds.

  • jak jay, leamongton spa

    Seen UK train drivers chatting on their 'phones more then a few times passenger and freight and as for the Spanish crash,wonder how long the drivers training was for,apparently he'd only been a HST driver for a year
    so its not only down to him

  • Stuart, London

    Short of a mechanical or electrical failure - yes the driver must take responsibility. No excuses.

    Except we must be careful that his obvious culpability is not used to mask other responsibility for this crash. Dumping on the driver to escape their role.

    This includes the proven dangers of drivers losing focus after long straights going into a bend no matter how many times the driver has done it correctly before (Morpeth). Was it absolutely necessary to have this bend or was it a design compromise? Who took the decision and what was the advice at the time?

    And the control system should surely have slowed the train somewhat whilst still in the tunnel which should have significantly mitigated the incident. It looks like that failed or was not operational.

    That leaves a single point of failure - the driver. Sooner or later fate is going to catch up. Looks like it did.

  • Roger, Paisley, UK

    My personal opinion is that he is up the creek without a paddle but you never know what the defence lawyers will come up with!

  • Chris Neville-Smith, Durham, England

    Oh dear, not a nice development. But I thought from the outset this was the way things would go.

    No matter which way you look at it, the fact remains that the train driver knowingly took a train round a bed at more than double the speed limit. Whilst some questions need to be asked about whether the train signalling ought to have stopped this, that is no excuse. It would be no better than an HGV driver going at 100mph, causing multiple fatalities, and then blaming the deaths on the speed limiter not working.

    The only two defences I could see are either poor training or a malfunction on the train. It looks like neither of those things apply. Could he have been careless enough to forget the speed limit had just gone down to 80km/h? Doesn't seem likely. You wouldn't get off the hook for "forgetting" to slow down for a bend on a road whether or not there were any speed limits, so I don't see the difference here. There is a small distinction that train drivers can't always see hazards in front of them in time to brake, but seriously, how likely it is that a driver could have forgotten a bend was coming up?

    I always wait and see what the defendant says before drawing any final conclusions, but I haven't a clue how he can get himself off the hook here.